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Introduction
Scholarly interest in party systems is motivated in part by a desire to better understand the inherent characteristics of party systems, but even more so by awareness that these characteristics can significantly impact on the functioning of political systems. Research has shown that the characteristics of party systems-or party system attributes-can affect government stability, political stability, fiscal irresponsibility, and legislative outputs, as well as numerous other governance outcomes (e.g., Chhibber and Nooruddin, 2004; Mainwaring, Erdmann and Basedau, 2008) .
The remainder of the article is organized in five sections. The first section races the emergence of the qualitative-quantitative divide, highlighting two themes: the increasing reluctance of qualitative party system specialists to use quantitative metrics; and the often crudetreatment that quantitative measurement tools give to qualitative insights. Building on this discussion, we make the case for deeper integration of qualitative and quantitative research, arguing that qualitative insights can enable quantitative scholars to construct better measures and that such measures can be usefully employed in qualitative analysis. Our demonstration of this argument centers on the classification of party systems, which has been an important agenda within the qualitative scholarship.
The second section shows that scholars who apply Sartori's typology-still the most widely used schema (see e.g., Wolinetz, 2004; -sometimes reach different conclusions about the classification of particular cases. In some cases, an apparent disagreement may be due to a basic misclassification, if a real-world system is classified as a type even though it clearly lacks the essential attributes of that type. In other cases, however, the disagreement may be more subtle and depend on judgments about the extent to which a type exhibits a property. In these more difficult situations, a properly crafted quantitative measure, which is consistent with the logic of the qualitative theory, can be used to resolve disagreements. We use the recently developed index of party system fluidity to demonstrate this argument. Given its newness to the literature, we discuss the index and some of its properties in the paper's third section. Then, in the fourth section, we show how it can be used to harmonize three prominent classifications of African party systems (Bogaards,2004; Erdmann and Basedau, 2008) . The final section summarizes the preceding analyses.
Emergence of the Qualitative-Quantitative Divide
To explore the emergence of the qualitative-quantitative divide in party systems research, it is useful to have in mind a clear definition of the terms "qualitative" and "quantitative." These terms are widely used in social-science research, but not always consistently. For our purposes, we draw on the influential scales-of-measurement theory, proposed initially by the psychologist S.S. Stevens (see Jacoby, 1999) , to define these terms. This theory distinguishes four levels at which entities can be compared. At the nominal level, entities are divided into classes based on their observable properties or some underlying theoretical criteria. It has been common to restrict the use of the term "qualitative" to comparisons that operate at this level, and this is the approach we follow in this paper. The nominal level can be contrasted against ordinal, interval and ratio levels of measurement, all of which are usually considered
The development of classification schemes to identify and compare distinct types of party systems has long been central to the qualitative research agenda on party systems (e.g., Blondel, 1968; Duverger, 1951; La Palombara and Weiner, 1966; Macridis, 1967; Rokkan, 1968) . The types in a typology operate at the nominal level so, strictly speaking, there is no numerical relationship between them. However, early scholars of party systems used the quantitative information that was available at that time-namely, the number of parties and their relative electoral strength-for classification purposes (see especially Wolinetz 2006: 55-56) . In this sense, their classification schemes crossed the standard qualitative-quantitative divide. Duverger (1951) categorized party systems on the basis of the number of parties and identified "one," "two" and "multiparty" systems. These categories were types, but the theoretical dimension used to derive them, the number of parties, is a ratio scale. Blondel (1968) examined the share of votes won by the two largest parties and the distribution of support between the two major parties, and on this basis identified two-party systems, twoand-half-party systems, multiparty systems with a predominant party and multiparty systems without a predominant party. This schema nested qualitative and quantitative criteria. Like Duverger's typology, it distinguished between types using the number of parties, a quantitative dimension. Blondel went beyond Duverger, however, by differentiating various kinds of multiparty systems using qualitative criteria: the existence or absence of a minor ("half") party or a predominant party.
2 But these criteria were operationalized using quantitative data. The half-party in a two-party system existed when the share of the vote of the two largest parties exceeded 89 per cent, while a predominant party existed when the strongest party averaged 40 percent or more of the vote and twice as much as the second party.
In Parties and Party Systems, Sartori (2005 Sartori ( [1976 ) proposed what thereafter became the most influential party systems typology. He distinguished seven distinct types, but quantitative information was relevant to the theoretical specification of these types and their identification in the real world. The number of "relevant" parties-that is, parties with coalitional or blackmail potential-is essential to Sartori's classification scheme. One-party, hegemonic-party, and predominant-party systems are characterized by the presence of a single relevant party, two-party systems are characterized by the presence of two relevant parties, moderate pluralist party systems have between three and five relevant parties, while polarized pluralist party systems have more than five parties because that is the level of fragmentation at which fragmentation exacerbates ideological polarization. Numbers feature prominently in Sartori's framework in a second respect: the determination of whether a system has one, two, between 3 and 5, or more than five relevant parties largely depends on the parties' electoral returns which are expressed in numerical form.
With the exception of a few recent studies (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Ware, 1996) , the development of qualitative typologies using quantitative information has generally been abandoned by party system scholars. Party system taxonomists (Wolinetz, 2004: 9) explain this change by saying that with the development of sophisticated measures of party system attributes, quantitatively-inclined scholars lost interest in "tiresome exercises in taxonomy." New tools to measure attributes such as "fragmentation" and "polarization" were shown to be associated with far-reaching political and economic consequences, including government stability (Taylor and Herman, 1971) , legislative stability (Pelizzo and Cooper, 2002) , the stability of presidential regimes (Mainwaring, 1993) , the quantity and quality of legislation (Tsebelis, 1999) , and the prevalence of electoral cycles in fiscal policy (Alt, Dreyer and Lassen, 2006) . Moreover, analyses using the new metrics could largely avoid the difficulties and uncertainties associated with classification since they required the analyst to count (in various ways) rather than identify differences of kind. A further criticism of the qualitative approach applied specifically to the influential Sartori typology. Scholars such as Peter Mair (1996) argued that due to party system changes since the 1970s-including the demise of authoritarianism, communism, and fascism in Europe and the weakening of traditional cleavage structures-there had been a convergence of party systems into the moderate pluralist category. This crowding of moderate pluralism, and the emptying out of other types, made classification on the basis of Sartori's typology less useful for understanding variation in the functioning of party systems. With quantitative metrics, however, it was possible to undertake finer-grained analyses of party systems within the bloated moderate pluralist category. In short, quantitative scholars believed that the new measures could make a greater contribution than once popular typologies.
Meanwhile, qualitatively-oriented scholars, who were at first doubtful ofthe merits of quantitative measures, became increasingly sceptical of them and keen to expose their limitations (see e.g., Mair, 1996; Ware, 1996 Ware, , 2009 Wolinetz, 2004 Wolinetz, , 2006 . This scepticism is echoed by Bogaards (2004: 174) who recently argued that "attempts to make inferences about the type of party system on the basis of indexes of party number are seriously flawed."Furthermore, Bogaards remarked, "The failure of mathematical indexes to identify party systems illustrates the tension that exists between the assumption of a continuum underlying mathematical measures of party number and 'jumps' that occur in real-life politics and are incorporated in discontinuous classification" (Bogaards, 2004:188) .This critique of quantitative metrics has not been matched by innovations from qualitiative scholars to remedy these problems. There have been only a few attempts to develop new typologies that improve upon Sartori's. Crucially, none of these efforts has become popular in the way that Sartori's typology did, so this typology continues to dominate in qualitative research even though scholars are quick to point out its limitations.
On the other hand, qualitatively-oriented scholars have had little choice but to rely on quantitative metrics. This point is apparent in qualitative studies that aim to distinguish between "stable" and "unstable" party systems (e.g., Bogaards, 2004 Bogaards, , 2008 Erdmann and Basedau, 2008) . This qualitative distinction is important when applying Sartori's typology in emerging states, or "fluid polities, "because Sartori developed separate, and slightly different, classification schemes for systems that could be considered relatively stable and those that were unstable. Sartori also proposed a qualitiative indicator to distinguish between these two classes: the existence or absence of mass parties. But, as we discuss later, this can be a problematic indicator of stability. Therefore, scholars have usually turned to quantitative metrics of "volatility" to measure system stability. From a qualitative standpoint, this approach is less than ideal. It leaves unsettled the question of how to determine a suitable cut-off point to separate stable and unstable party systems. Moreover, these metrics do not capture the stability of a party system, when this term is conceptualized in the Sartori sense to mean the pattern of competition-they tend to capture change in the electoral standing of parties in a party system, which can occur while a pattern of competition remains stable.
To summarize, the early scholarship on party systems made a serious effort to integrate quantitative and qualitative approaches. But since the 1970s, a division has arisen between (1) scholars who largely reject qualitative classification and (2) those who defend its value and continue to apply the Sartori typology, while noting its problems and despite having to use slightly problematic metrics to conduct their analyses. The development of these two perspectives-and, to some extent, the emergence of parallel literatures-stands in contrast to the early scholarship which embraced and mixed quantitative and qualitative perspectives. In our view, this qualitative-quantitative divide seems likely to have obstructed potential gains from cross-fertilizing quantitative rigour with qualitative insights. The remainder of this paper seeks to demonstrate the complementarity of these approaches. In particular, we aim to show that qualitative insights can facilitate better, more theoreticallyrigorous measurement tools (Collier, La Porte and Seawright, 2012) , and these measures can then be deployed by qualitative scholars in their classificatory efforts.
From a "System of Interactions" to a "Party System"
In an important passage in his book, Sartori noted that "parties make for a 'system', then, only when they are parts (in the plural); and a party system is precisely the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition. That is the system in question bears on the relatedness of parties to each other, on how each party is a function (in the mathematical sense) of the other parties and reacts, competitively or otherwise, to other parties" (2005:39).
Thus, following the Sartori perspective, there is no doubt that a party system results from the pattern of inter-party competition. However, the existence of a pattern of inter-party competition does not in itself imply the existence of a party system. A party system exists only if the pattern of inter-party competition is stable over time. In other words, stability of the pattern of competition is necessary for "parties to make for a system."While stable patterns of interparty competition are party systems, unstable patterns of competition indicate a "fluid polity." As Sartori explains, "viscosity, resilience, and immobilizing impact of structures" (Sartori, 2005:217) are what distinguish patterns of inter-party competition in fluid polities from party systems proper.
While stability or fluidity is a discriminating factor, the pattern of competitionwhich is the basis of Sartori's "types"-is not. This is why Sartori (2005 Sartori ( [1976 ), and later Bogaards (2004 Bogaards ( , 2008 and Erdmann and Basedau (2008) , could say that the patterns of competition in structured party systems were also detectable in fluid polities, and vice versa.
The pattern of competition that gives rise to one-party and hegemonic-party systems in structured polities is the functional analogue of the dominant authoritarian pattern in fluid polities. The pattern associated with the predominant-party system in a structured party system finds its counterpart in the dominant non-authoritarian pattern in fluid polities. Twoparty, moderate pluralist and polarized pluralist systems are the structured analogue of the non-dominant pattern in fluid polities, while the atomized system is the stable mirror image of the pulverized pattern in fluid polities.
The widespread application of these categories testified to, and indeed was responsible for, the success of Sartori's framework. These categories have been used to study party systems in all of the major geographical regions, though their best-known applications have been in studies of structured, and predominantly Western, party systems. In recent years, the framework has been used to classify party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bogaards, 2004; Bogaards, 2008; Erdmann and Basedau, 2008) . The results of these three well-known classificatory efforts suggest there is some agreement but also some significant disagreement about how African party systems should be classified using Sartori's categories.
Given that the framework is meant to capture the fundamental properties of party systems, such disagreement suggests uncertainty about the applicability of Sartori's framework or the characteristics of the party systems in question. (2008) and Erdmann and Basedau (2008) , only five of the 20 party systems classified by Bogaards (Benin, Lesotho, Malawi, Senegal and Zimbabwe) are classified in the same way by Erdmann and Basedau.
[ Erdmann and Basedau (2008) , the pattern is non-dominant authoritarian. Hence, in nearly all cases, the disagreements among these classifications depend entirely on whether patterns of competition should be regarded as structured or fluid. These disagreements suggest, however, that determining whether a party system is "structured" or "fluid" is far from straightforward. In the section that follows, we review some alternative approaches to resolving this issue.
Structuration versus Fluidity
When Sartori conducted the analyses that were eventually presented in Parties and Party Systems(1976) , many African countries had just become independent and the parties and party systems in the region had just been created. It was too early to assess whether these emergent patterns of competition would "consolidate" or "institutionalize," and therefore Sartori chose to regard such patterns as "fluid."Party system scholars have adopted, over the years, various indicators to assess the extent of such party system "institutionalization."
A Sartorian line of inquiry assesses the institutionalization of African party systems based on the presence/absence of mass parties (Bogaards, 2008: 178) , building on Sartori's (2005: 217) argument that "a party system becomes structured when it contains solidly entrenched mass parties." This approach assumes a strong connection between the existence of mass parties and the stability of the pattern of competition. In Africa, however, proper mass parties are rare, but there is clearly significant variation in the stability of party systems.
Some studies (Mozaffar et al. 2003; Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005; Bogaards, 2008; Weghorst and Bernhard, 2014 ) employ Pedersen's index of volatility (Pedersen, 1979) to evaluate party system institutionalization in Africa. Pedersen's index computes the net change in parties' vote or seat totals between elections. This approach works on the assumption that high volatility indicates absence of consolidation. However, other studies, such as Bartolini and Mair (1990) , challenge this claim. Disaggregating volatility into two basic types, they argue that while between-bloc volatility-the volatility caused by the voteswitching across cleavage lines-provides a proper indication of the extent of consolidation, within-bloc volatility-vote-switching between parties on the same side of a cleavage/issueprovides no such indication. More recently, Powell and Tucker (2014) decompose total volatility into "Type A" and "Type B" volatility, which indicate, respectively, vote-switching to new parties and vote-switching among existing parties. These measures are used by Weghorst and Bernhard (2014:1730) to argue that the steady decline in Type A volatility and the corresponding increase in Type B volatility provide "important evidence of the beginning of party system institutionalization," and suggest that "that party systems in sub-Saharan Africa are volatile but institutionalizing over time" (Weghorst and Bernhard, 2014:1708) . Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) apply multiple criteria to assess institutionalization.
They treat institutionalization as a function of acceptance/legitimacy of the electoral process and results, the stability of party rootedness in society, and the regularity of party competition. The legitimacy/acceptance of the electoral process is assessed on the basis of whether a major party boycotts elections, whether losers accept the electoral result, and whether elections are free and fair. The stability of party roots is measured on the basis of parties' average age and the percentage of lower chamber seats held by parties created by 1970. Finally, they estimate the regularity of party competition by computing volatility in legislative elections, volatility of presidential elections and the difference between levels of volatility recorded in these two types of elections.
Erdmann and Basedau (2008) adopt a two-stage approach to categorize African party system. In the first stage, they use Sartori's typology for fluid polities to categorize patterns of competition in Africa as dominant, non-dominant and pulverized. In the second stage, they assess whether the patterns of competition previously identified should be regarded as "fluid" or "structured." A party system qualifies as "institutionalized" when there have been at least three consecutive elections, democracy has not been interrupted, seat volatility is no higher than 40 (according to Pedersen's index), and average party age is at least 15 years (or nearly as old as the democratic regime itself).
The approaches applied by Weghorst and Bernhard, Kuenzi and Lambright, and
Erdmann and Basedau each amend the basic volatility index as developed by Pedersen. In the case of Weghorst and Bernhard, the measurement of volatility is amended, while Kuenzi and Lambright and Erdmann and Basedau bolster the measurement of volatility by tapping other party system dimensions. In each approach, however, the measurement strategy is centered on the volatility of the parties in the system, rather than the system itself. Furthermore, due to this plurality of approaches, party system scholars have reached different conclusions about whether particular party systems should be regarded as structured or fluid, and whether "African party systems" in general should be regarded as structured or fluid. The absence of mass parties and high levels of total volatility have led some scholars (Bogaards, 2008) to regard patterns of interparty competition in Africa as fluid, while declining rates of Type A volatility and the regularity/legitimacy of interparty competition have led other scholars to consider at least some African party systems as increasingly if not properly institutionalized (Weghorst and Bernhard, 2014) .
We suggest a new approach for estimating the extent to which patterns of competition are fluid or structured in this region, which aims to measure directly the stability of a party system, rather than the volatility of the parties that make up that system. Like Erdmann and
Basedau (2008) First, our approach avoids the risk of putting together systems that differ in significant respects. The dominant category used by Erdmann and Basedau (2008) could apply to the fluid analogue of the predominant-party system if consistent with democratic practice, but also to the fluid analogue of the one-party and hegemonic-party systems when coupled with authoritarian tendencies. However, the distinction between democratic dominance and autocratic dominance is theoretically and practically important. Similarly, the fact that a system of interaction has two relevant parties makes it quite different from a system with a larger number of relevant parties, though both might be considered "non-dominant." Our decision to use Sartori's principal types prevents the conflation of such different patterns.
Second, our approach enables a more empirically-sensitive classification. Because Erdmann and Basedau (2008) use only three categories to classify patterns of competition, they can only detect changes among these categories. Using seven categories we can detect not only the changes that Erdmann and Basedau detect, but also changes that occur among those patterns of competition that are lumped together in Erdmann and Basedau's (2008) classification.
Having categorized patterns of competition, we then proceed in the second stage to detect whether change in the pattern of interparty competition has occurred within a country.
In doing so, we track not only whether a system change has occurred but also the magnitude of change. Any change in pattern of competition indicates some degree of instability in a country's party system, but some changes are more destabilizing than others. Change from a one-party system to a hegemonic-party system or from polarized pluralism to atomizationwhich are contiguous categories-is less transformative than change from a one-party system to an atomized system. Change from a one-party system to a hegemonic-party system implies change in the mechanism by which the relevant party secures its relevance, but the number of relevant parties in the system remains unchanged. Similarly, in a change from polarized pluralism to atomization, a system that already has a high number of relevant parties becomes a system with an even higher number of parties. Butif a change occurs between the one-party and atomized systems we witness change from a system of maximum power concentration to a system where power is so dispersed that it is almost no longer a system.
Once this information is collected, we follow Nwokora and Pelizzo (2015) by calculating the magnitude of party system change along three distinct dimensions. One pertains to the frequency of change; one pertains to the scope or extent or change; while the third concerns the variety of change, that is, the number of distinct patterns that a party system goes through in its historical development. Each dimension is relevant for understanding the dynamics of party systems. Furthermore, they do not necessarily correlate, which means that a party system can be stable in one sense while being unstable in another.
An example would be a system that undergoes regular changes between the same two types.
Such a party system would have a high frequency of change, but a low variety of change. If the changes occurred between two types with reasonably similar mechanical properties-for example, the predominant and two-party types-then the scope of change would also be low.
We could conclude, in a party system with this dynamic pattern, that the predominant party fails to consolidate its predominance over time or the two-party system is unable to ensure regular alternation of parties in office.
The frequency of party system change is measured by dividing the number of changes in the pattern of competition by the number of elections (since independence and up to and including 2012). The scope or extent of change is calculated on the basis of an ordinal scale with seven points spanning from "one-party system" to "atomized system."To calculate the variety of change, we observe the number of different types that are observed in a country during a historical period. The scores for each sub-dimension are multiplied to produce an "index of fluidity" score. Let us consider an example to see how this score can be computed.
The Seychelles experienced three party system changes in the period from 1970 until 2012:
from a two-party system (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) to a one-party system (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) ; from a one-party system to a predominant-party system (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) ; and from a predominant-party system to a two-party system (2011 onwards). These three transitions occurred over the course of 10 elections, giving a frequency of 0.3. The scope of change, from a two-party system to a oneparty system, equals three. The variety of change also equals three. The total fluidity score in this case is therefore 2.7, which is comparatively low for the region (see Appendix).
From Measurement to Classification
The index yields quantitative measures, but it requires input of qualitative data, which relies on knowledge of the relevant countries' elections, parties and party systems. Thus, the index's computation necessitates some bridging of the qualitative-quantitative divide. The qualitative-quantitative divide is also overcome in a second way: the index can improve the precision of qualitiative classification. Specifically, the index of fluidity provides analysts with the information necessary to determine whether patterns of competition are fluid or structured. As we discussed earlier, the disputed classifications in prominent taxonomies of African party systems turn on the answer to this question.
Our computations reveal that African party systems display highly variable levels of fluidity (see Table 2 and Appendix). In countries such as Namibia, South Africa, Botswana, Djibuti, The Gambia and Zimbabwe, patterns of interparty competition are highly stable. The party systems of these countries can be properly regarded as "stable" or "structured."At the other extreme, the data reveal that patterns of competition in Mali, Burkina Faso, Senegal and
Mauritania have been rather unstable, which sustains the claim that these are fluid party systems. As a preliminary test of the validity of the index (in the African context), we correlate the 2012 estimates against countries' 2008 fluidity scores. This test reveals a very strong, positive and statistically correlation between these estimates (r = .949, sig. = .000), which indicates that the measure yields estimates that are stable over time. This suggests that the index is a reliable tool. Moreover, it suggests that the party systems identified by the index as being relativley stable are likely to remain so (at least in the short run), while unstable party systems will tend to continue to display unstable properties.
We also correlated these fluidity scores against several measures that might be expected to be empirically associated with party system stability, namely Kuenzi and Lambright's index of institutionalization, Basedau and Stroh's index of institutionalization (Basedau and Stroh, 2008) , and the World Governance Indicators' measure of political stability (Kaufmann et al., 2014) .290, sig. = .045). This finding has an important practical implication: it suggests that fluidity might have potential as a prognostic tool for estimating political risk; its utility in this capacity diminishes the further into the future the projection is made.
[ Table 2 here]
In addition to being a valid and reliable measure of party system dynamics, the index of fluidity can also be employed to categorize party systems. As noted above, Erdmann and Basedau (2008) classified seven party systems (Benin, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Madagascar, Senegal, Zimbabwe) in exactly the same way as Bogaards (2004) , with both studies agreeing these patterns of inter-party competition are unstable. The fluidity index scores for 2012, presented in Table 2 , largely sustain this claim. In Madagascar, Mali and Senegal, the pattern of interparty competition has been highly unstable and these systems should therefore be regarded as fluid. These countries post fluidity index scores that are among the highest in the sample. However, computing the fluidity index for Benin suggests a party system that may be more stable than has been conventionally recognized. It posts a fluidity score of 3, which is comparatively low for the region, but was regarded by Bogaards (2004) and Erdmann and Basedau (2008) as unstable. Table 2 also shows that if the stability of competition is measured autonomously (on the basis of electoral returns alone), as the fluidity index aims to do, rather than heteronomously (on the basis of, for instance, political violence), both Kenya and Zimbabwe should be regarded as structured party systems. A similar observation might also be made of Lesotho, which posts a "borderline" fluidity index score.
11 out of the 18 cases that appear in Bogaards (2004) and Erdmann and Basedau (2008) are classified differently. In most cases-the exception is Zambia-disagreement consisted in the fact that while Bogaards (2004) regarded all the systems of interaction as fluid, Erdmann and Basedau (2008) considered them structured. Looking at the data presented in Table 2 , we see that Erdmann and Basedau's assessment is supported by the 2012 fluidity scores in half of the cases (5 out of 10). In Botswana, Cameroon, Gabon, Mauritius, Namibia, patterns of competition display relatively little or no fluidity. Therefore, Erdmann and Basedau are quite correct to regard these systems as structured. On the other hand, the patterns of competition observed in Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Mauritania, and Sao Tome and Principe accord more closely with Bogaards's classification of them as highly fluid. In the case of the Zambian party system, the disagreement between these classifications depends on whether that system should be regarded as a dominant or a nondominant authoritarian system, but both studies agree on the fact that the pattern of to that of Lesotho and Zambia, and therefore might be reasonably described as "stable" or "unstable."
Conclusions
We have argued that our knowledge about party systems would improve more rapidly if, in instead of reinforcing the qualitative-quantitative methodological divide, qualitative and quantitative party system scholars found ways to influence each other's analyses.
Quantitatively-oriented party system scholars could benefit from the input of qualitativelyoriented scholars especially when refining quantitative tools. On the other hand, qualitativelyoriented party system scholars could also benefit from using properly crafted and wellinformed quantitative measures and indexes for their taxonomic purposes.
In this paper we presented a theory-based, qualitatively-informed measure of party system change and have tried to show how it can improve party system classification. This is because the index of fluidity can enable party system scholars to establish whether a pattern of competition is largely structured or fluid. It is not an alternative to classification, we argue, but an effective tool to make classification more rigorous. The qualitative-quantitative methodological divide is a relatively recent development. The originators of party system research (Duverger, Sartori, Rokkan) applied qualitative and quantitative information to analyze party systems. In this paper, we have also argued that such integration can produce better scholarship than either numbers-aversion or numbers-obsession. 
